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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a driving force of growth for every developing 
economy. It brings new capital, technology and know-how. This investment comes either in 
the form of a greenfield project, where a new plant is built and therefore a new company 
formed, or in the form of foreign capital inflow to an existing domestic company. In both 
cases, this company is typically characterized by higher productivity and competitiveness 
(Javorcik and Arnold 2005).  
Besides these direct effects from FDI, there are also varieties of indirect effects. The 
entry of any high productivity company should naturally encourage other companies within 
the same sector to improve their performance and competitiveness. The increase in efficiency 
of the production process can happen by copying new technologies or by hiring trained 
workers and managers from foreign-owned companies (Javorcik 2004). On the other hand, 
those domestic companies that are not able to catch up with the higher performance of other 
companies within the sector may be crowded out of the market. In general, these effects are 
referred to as horizontal spillovers.  
However, companies from sectors other than that of the foreign enterprise might be 
affected by its presence as well if they are in direct business contact with it. This includes 
companies that supply or provide services for foreign firms, as well as companies that are 
supplied by foreign firms. It is likely that foreign companies require higher standards from 
their suppliers. On the other hand, it is also likely that higher standards are provided by 
foreign companies to domestic companies as well, which might improve the domestic 
companies’ efficiency and performance. In general, these effects are referred to as vertical 
spillovers.  
An extent of these spillovers depends also on the type of foreign investment. Based on 
the industry where they operate, foreign investors have several options. If they are in non-
tradable business, they can pick the best local company, take over and price others out of the 
local market. Or they can pick the industry with weak local companies and put in a 
greenfield. In both of these cases we can expect negative horizontal spillovers. On the other 
hand, if they operate in exporting industry, they do not have to care about local companies 
within a sector. They can find good suppliers and concentrate on export. This may result in 
positive horizontal and backward spillovers. Another important factor is a character of an 
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 investment itself. Takeovers usually start by improving acquired companies’ organization and 
management; new technologies may arrive much later. Moreover, they are likely to use an 
existing network of suppliers and customers. Whereas greenfields often bring state-of-the-art 
technologies immediately and may not use local markets at all.  
Governments in transition and developing countries often compete to attract foreign 
investors by offering them various advantages. The Czech Republic is no exception. In 1998 
its government approved a system of subsidies for foreign investors that was supposed to 
increase the competitiveness of Czech industry. One of the supporting arguments was that 
foreign investors would help other domestic companies to improve. However, contrary to 
these arguments and expectations, the recent study by Stančík (2007) shows that the impact 
on domestic companies is actually negative. This brings up new interesting questions. Does 
this negative impact differ with different type of investment? Is there a type of investment 
that we should support more?  
The goal of this paper is therefore to answer these questions by analyzing the effects of 
FDI on the performance of domestic companies in the Czech Republic with respect to 
different types of foreign investment – acquisitions and greenfields. We study these effects 
within the same sector as well as through vertical linkages. We employ up-to-date data that 
cover the period 1995-2005. We also focus on the time structure of these effects.  
To our best knowledge, this is the first paper analyzing FDI spillovers on firm-level 
data by dividing them into takeovers and greenfields. Therefore, one of the goals of this paper 
is to suggest a framework that might be used and further developed in future empirical 
studies.  
This paper finds that there are differences between the two types of foreign investment; 
in sign of their impact on domestic companies as well as in magnitude. Particularly, 
supplying domestic companies are affected by the presence of foreign investors downstream 
through negative backward spillover effects. Since foreign investors prefer to import their 
supplies from abroad, Czech supplying companies oriented mainly on domestic markets 
consequently lose on sales. The impact is double in case of greenfields. Regarding horizontal 
spillover effects, they are much smaller in magnitude. However, the main difference is that 
they differ in sign. The impact of greenfields remains negative, while the impact of takeovers 
on domestic companies within the same sector is now positive. No forward spillover effects 
are present. Furthermore, the results suggest a dynamic pattern in FDI spillovers. Initial 
positive/negative horizontal spillovers from takeovers/greenfields are later translated into 
positive/negative forward spillovers.  
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 The paper is structured as follows. The second section deals with the previous studies 
relevant for this research. Our research strategy is explained in the third section. The fourth 
section contains the data description. The empirical results are presented in the fifth section. 
The last section concludes.   
2. Literature Review 
One of the first studies investigating the benefits for domestic companies from FDI 
using company-level panel data is Aitken and Harrison (1999) who employ data from 
Venezuela during the years 1976-1989. They find a positive effect of FDI on smaller 
domestic companies and a small negative effect of FDI on all domestic companies. They 
further claim that the positive effect of the presence of foreign enterprises is gained by joint 
ventures with foreign capital. According to the authors, the overall effect is thus only slightly 
positive. Javorcik (2004) goes a little bit further and besides horizontal spillovers, she stresses 
also the role of vertical spillover effects. Her research is based on a sample of Lithuanian 
companies in the period 1996-2000. She does not find any significant horizontal spillover 
effect or effects within a region. However, she finds a positive significant vertical spillover 
effect of FDI on domestic companies. She also claims there is no difference in magnitude 
between the effects from partially or fully foreign-owned companies.  
There are also several company-level studies of the Czech Republic. Djankov and 
Hoekman (2000) study the impact of FDI on total factor productivity growth of recipient 
firms and find that this impact is positive and significant. On the other hand, the effect of 
joint ventures is less positive and not statistically significant. As regards the spillover effects, 
they find a negative horizontal spillover effect of FDI and joint ventures, taken together, on 
domestic companies. Kinoshita (2000) finds no significant technology spillover effect of joint 
ventures or FDI on productivity growth neither within the firm nor within the industry. The 
author further examines the two roles of the firm’s R&D – innovation and absorptive 
capacity. She claims that the latter is far more important. According to her results, the effects 
of FDI are significant for firms that perform their own R&D – the horizontal spillover is 
positive and the direct effect is negative, whereas the effect of just R&D remains 
insignificant. Jarolím (2001) concentrates mainly on the performance of foreign-owned 
companies, but he examines also the horizontal spillover effects of FDI on domestic 
companies within the same sector. In line with the previous literature, he shows that foreign-
owned companies are characterized by higher total factor productivity. However, he does not 
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 find any significant horizontal spillover effects. Moreover, he compares the performance of 
greenfield ventures with foreign acquisitions and concludes that the former perform 
significantly better.  
Damijan et al. (2003a) examine the direct effect of FDI, intra-industry knowledge 
spillovers from FDI and the impact of firms’ own R&D accumulation on productivity growth 
using a sample of eight transition countries.
1 Regarding the Czech Republic, they find a 
positive direct effect of FDI on domestic recipient companies. Intra-industry knowledge 
spillovers are found to be insignificant, but, similarly to Kinoshita (2000), their significance 
increases when controlling for a firm’s own R&D. Surprisingly, the productivity growth of 
Czech companies that perform their own R&D decreases with foreign presence in the 
industry. In a closely related study, Damijan et al. (2003b) use the same sample and add 
Lithuania and Latvia. Their analysis now incorporates not only horizontal but also vertical 
spillovers. They conclude that vertical spillover effects are more important than horizontal 
effects. Particularly, both of these effects are positive in the Czech Republic.  
These previous studies about the Czech Republic have some similar characteristics. 
Most of them suffer from small samples and from focusing on the early transition period. 
Early transition (i.e., 1991-1996) is characterized by mass privatization and unclear 
ownership structures, whereas the main boom of foreign investment came in and after 1998 
(see Figure 1 in the Appendix), which is the last sample year in almost all of these studies. 
Therefore, there is no surprise that they often did not succeed in finding any significant 
spillover effects. Furthermore, most of this previous literature is limited to manufacturing 
sectors only. However, it is likely that especially domestic companies from service sectors 
would be affected by the presence of foreign investors. Unlike manufacturing companies, 
these companies are not able to export their services abroad and they are limited to domestic 
market only. Finally, they incorporate mostly only horizontal spillovers.  
Stančík (2007) attempts to improve over this literature by analyzing the effects of FDI 
on sales growth rate using a panel of 4,067 Czech companies from all sectors during the 
period of 1995-2003. He studies both horizontal and vertical spillovers. Moreover, he pays 
attention also to the potential endogeneity of FDI with respect to future industry growth. The 
results suggest that domestic companies are mostly suffering in the presence of foreign 
companies, especially in upstream sectors.  
A slightly different concept is studied in Kosová (2004) where she concentrates on the 
                                                 
1 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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 crowding-out effect from the presence of foreign companies. She uses a sample of 9,986 
Czech companies from all sectors covering the period 1994-2001. She finds a positive effect 
of foreign capital presence on domestic firms’ growth and survival. She claims that exit rates 
are lower for companies in industries with foreign presence. On the other hand, Kosová and 
Ayyagari (2006) deal with the impact of FDI on domestic entrepreneurship. They find that 
foreign presence contributes positively to the entry rates of domestic companies through both 
horizontal and vertical spillovers. Although both of these effects are statistically significant, 
they claim the dominance of vertical spillovers over horizontal spillovers, especially through 
forward linkages. For this research they use a sample of 9,979 Czech companies covering the 
period 1994-2000.  
There is another string of literature which focuses more closely on different types of 
foreign investment, not necessarily in the Czech Republic. However, instead of studying 
spillover effects, one part of this literature concentrates on direct impact of FDI on its 
recipients (Evenett and Voicu [2003]; Hanousek et al. [2005]; Javorcik and Arnold [2005]). 
The common finding from these studies is that acquired companies are positively affected by 
the presence of foreign investors. The other part of literature then studies distinct modes of 
entry of foreign investors. It usually deals with strategies of foreign investors or factors 
contributing to their decision process (Zejan [1990]; Hennart and Park [1993]; Harzing 
[2002]; Aminian et al. [2005]).  
Regarding the literature that would clearly connect these two concepts – FDI spillovers 
and the type of foreign investment, there is almost nothing. One of the attempts is Wang and 
Wong (2007). They separate FDI into greenfields and cross-border mergers & acquisitions 
and study the impact on economic growth. However, this is a country level study and 
greenfield FDI is only estimated from total FDI inflow values. The main reason for shortage 
of studies about this issue is probably a lack of information in data that would allow to 
distinguish between acquisitions and greenfields.   
3. Research Approach 
3.1. Spillover Variables 
In this study we follow the approach of Stančík (2007) and create six spillover 
variables. The variable THORIZjt measures the foreign presence
2 in takeovers within a sector. 
                                                 
2 We interpret a company as foreign if it has at least 10% of its equity owned by a foreign investor. The same 
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 It represents the share of foreign capital invested in acquired domestic companies by foreign 
ones, i.e., in takeovers, in sector j at time t and is defined as  
   (1) 
where FSijt denotes the share of foreign capital in firm i at time t in sector j, given that 
firm i is a takeover, and FAijt denotes the fixed assets of firm i at time t in sector j.  
The variable TBACKjt represents the weighted share of foreign capital in takeovers in 
all sectors that are supplied by sector j at time t and, conversely, the variable TFORWjt 
represents the weighted share of foreign capital in takeovers in all sectors that supply sector j 
at time t. They are defined as  
   (2) 
  , (3) 
where βxyt stands for the fraction of output from sector x supplied to sector y at time t. 
TBACKjt measures the presence of foreign takeovers downstream and TFORWjt measures the 
presence of foreign takeovers upstream.  
In a similar fashion we define three remaining variables GHORIZjt,  GBACKjt, 
GFORWjt. The only difference is that instead of foreign capital in takeovers these variables 
are now related to foreign capital invested in greenfields that are built by foreign investors.  
3.2. Theoretical Model 
The goal of this paper is to examine whether sales growth is affected by the share of 
foreign capital within and across sectors and whether these effects differ with respect to the 
type of foreign investment (takeovers vs. greenfields). For this purpose, we follow the 
methodology of Haddad and Harrison (1993). They assume a production function with value-
added Y that is a function of two inputs, capital K and labor L: 
   
The level of productivity is given by Ajt. It is assumed to vary across sectors j and time 
t. By using total differential, taking logs, and using the fact that the value of the marginal 
product for each factor equals its cost, we now have 
                                                                                                                                                        
threshold is also used in the Czech National Bank official definition of FDI and in Damijan et al. (2003b), 
Javorcik (2004), and Stančík (2007). 
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   , (4) 
where   is productivity growth. The coefficients on the growth of labor and capital 
are simply their share in value-added. We test the hypothesis that productivity growth is 
affected by the share of foreign capital both within and across sectors and that there are 
differences between takeovers and greenfields in these effects. Thus, we proceed by assuming 
that productivity growth can be decomposed into the following components: 
   (5) 
 
where  THORIZ,  TBACK, and TFORW are variables measuring the spillover effects 
from foreign takeovers, GHORIZ,  GBACK, and GFORW are variables measuring the 
spillover effects from foreign greenfields and the set of dummy variables, αt, is introduced to 
control for year-specific effects. A disturbance term εijt is added to account for possible 
changes in productivity growth due to stochastic shocks at the firm or sector level over time. 
Combining (4) and (5) yields the equation we estimate:  
   (6) 
4. Data 
The company-level annual data used here come from the ASPEKT database, which is a 
Czech source for the Amadeus database
3 and is widely used in empirical research (Earnhart 
and Lízal [2002]; Hanousek et al. [2005]; Bena and Hanousek [2006]). Financial data cover 
the period 1993-2006, include almost 30,000 Czech firms in total and form an unbalanced 
panel, where the number of usable companies varies from almost 2,000 in 1993 to more than 
19,000 in 2004. The ASPEKT database also provides information about companies’ 
ownership structure. However, due to the limited availability of this information, the total 
number of companies is significantly reduced. Ownership information allows us to 
distinguish foreign companies from domestic ones. Unfortunately, this ownership 
information does not allow to distinguish foreign takeovers from greenfields. For this 
purpose, we use internet and search web pages for history of all foreign companies in our 
sample. In contrast to most previous studies about FDI spillovers, we do not limit the analysis 
                                                 
3 Amadeus is a pan-European financial database. 
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 only to the manufacturing sectors. With few exceptions, we employ data from all sectors; 
only sectors with a strong regulatory role of the government are excluded (see the Appendix 
for details).  
For studying vertical spillover effects, we employ inter-industry data (input-output 
matrices) that come from the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) and are available for every year 
during 1995-2005. There is an often used assumption in previous studies
4 that these matrices 
do not change much over time. However, a descriptive analysis in Stančík (2007) reveals that 
for almost 30% of relations
5 the standard deviation over time is bigger than the mean value. 
Therefore, in order to remove possible measurement errors, we follow the approach in 
Stančík (2007) and use fitted values of time trends based on these matrices instead of the 
original values. In other words, we still have a different input-output matrix for each year but 
these matrices now capture trends in supplying and demanding rather than just oscillating 
official values.  
After merging all variables and performing several data cleaning procedures,
6 the 
resulting sample covers the period 1995-2005 and contains information about 4,253 
companies from 44 sectors,
7 23,680 observations in total. An overview of the time, sector 
and ownership structure of the final sample is provided in Table 1 and Table 3. The number 
of companies varies from 1,124 in 2005 to 2,788 in 2000. Foreign companies represent 26% 
of all observations. As regards sectors, most of the companies are from service sectors (56%) 
and manufacturing sectors (38%). Table 3 also includes information about the structure of our 
sample regarding takeovers and greenfields. From the total 4,253 companies, 12% are 
acquisitions and almost 19% are greenfields.  
Finally, Table 2 shows the summary statistics of all the variables used in this research. 
As regards the ownership structure, the average share of a foreign investor in a Czech 
company is almost 20%.   
                                                 
4 Damijan et al. (2003b), Javorcik (2004), or Kosová and Ayyagari (2006). 
5 A relation is a time series of the flow of goods and services from sector X to sector Y for the whole period 
1995-2005. There are almost 7,000 such relations – for every combination of sectors X and Y, as well as for the 
supply and demand relationship. These relations are used to generate a mean value and standard deviation for 
every time series. 
6 All of these procedures are described in the Appendix. 
7 At 2-digit NACE classification (Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community). 
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 5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Baseline Specification 
In order to study the horizontal and vertical spillover effects from FDI, the following 
modification of model (6) is estimated: 
 
 (7) 
where SALESijt, FAijt, and SCijt stand for sales, fixed assets, and staff costs, respectively, 
for firm i at time t in sector j. The set of year dummy variables, αt, is also introduced because 
sales, fixed assets, and staff costs are originally collected in nominal values. Moreover, each 
company has its own unobserved characteristics, e.g., better management or better 
technologies, which are assumed to be constant over time. For this reason, the variable γi is 
included for capturing such firm characteristics. Model (7) is thus estimated with firms’ fixed 
effects.  
A positive value of the variable THORIZjt would imply that the presence of foreign 
takeovers in the sector has a positive impact on the productivity of domestic companies 
within a sector. A positive value of the variable TBACKjt would imply that the presence of 
foreign takeovers has a positive impact on the productivity of those domestic companies that 
supply the foreign companies’ sectors. Similarly, a positive value of the variable TFORWjt 
would imply that the presence of foreign takeovers has a positive impact on the productivity 
of those domestic companies that are supplied by the foreign companies’ sectors. 
Furthermore, variables measuring spillover effects from greenfields are defined accordingly. 
A positive value of the variable GHORIZjt would imply that the presence of foreign 
greenfields in the sector has a positive impact on the productivity of domestic companies 
within a sector. A positive value of the variable GBACKjt would imply that the presence of 
foreign greenfields has a positive impact on the productivity of those domestic companies 
that supply the foreign companies’ sectors. Similarly, a positive value of the variable 
GFORWjt would imply that the presence of foreign greenfields has a positive impact on the 
productivity of those domestic companies that are supplied by the foreign companies’ sectors.  
Since the goal of this paper is to study the effects on domestic companies, model (7), as 
well as all further models, are estimated on a sample of “always-domestic” companies only. 
This sample excludes companies that are foreign at any time during the sample frame. It 
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 allows one to study the pure spillover effects of FDI that are not affected by the better 
performance of either foreign greenfield companies, local companies that have been taken 
over by a foreign entity or local companies that are about to become foreign in the near 
future. However, for comparison, we estimate model (7) using the whole company population 
as well, including foreign companies.  
Furthermore, in this kind of study, one has to be aware of the potential endogeneity of 
ownership at the firm level. In that case, foreign investors would acquire better domestic 
companies, while the worse ones would remain domestic. As a result, estimated coefficients 
would be biased towards negative values. In order to check whether this is the case, we also 
run regression (7) on a sample of companies that are always domestic plus the companies that 
will be acquired by foreign investors in the future during the period 1995-2005 but are still 
domestic now.  
The estimates from these regressions are summarized in Table 4. The first column 
includes the estimated coefficients using a sample of always-domestic companies. The 
coefficients of capital and labor inputs are positive and significant, which is in line with 
expectations. The coefficient of the horizontal spillover variable from takeovers is positive 
and weakly significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of the same variable but from 
greenfields is negative and more significant. This implies that domestic companies are 
gaining in the presence of foreign takeovers within the same industry but losing from the 
presence of foreign greenfields within the same sector. However, it is necessary to emphasize 
that economically, these effects are very small: a one-percentage point increase in foreign 
capital’s share in takeovers/greenfields within a sector causes an increase/decrease in the 
growth rate of the sales of domestic companies in the same sector by only 0.14/0.26 
percentage points. Since there are no previous studies dealing with an FDI impact of 
takeovers and greenfields separately, it is possible to compare these results only in global 
aspects. In this sense, these results are in line with previous studies, which mostly find only 
weak or non-significant horizontal spillover effect. One of the reason can be exactly the fact 
that the impact of takeovers differs from the impact of greenfields and put together, these 
impacts negate each other.  
Regarding backward spillovers, the situation is different when both coefficients are 
negative and strongly significant. These results correspond to previous finding by Stančík 
(2007) who finds negative backward spillover effects from FDI, though neither his study 
recognizes takeovers from greenfields. The current estimates suggest that domestic 
companies supplying both foreign takeovers and greenfields are negatively affected by their 
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 presence: a one-percentage point increase in foreign capital’s share in takeovers/greenfields 
in a downstream sector causes a decrease in the growth rate of the sales of supplying 
domestic companies by 0.7/1.5 percentage points. These impacts are about 5-6 times bigger 
than horizontal ones. The interesting fact is that the impact of greenfields is double in 
magnitude compared to takeovers and this holds for horizontal as well as for backward 
spillover effects. Finally, the coefficients of the forward spillover variables are in both cases 
insignificant so there are no spillover effects on consuming domestic companies.  
According to these results, domestic companies are mainly negatively affected by the 
presence of foreign investors, either takeovers or greenfields, in downstream sectors. The 
explanation for this finding can be found in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 shows the results from a 
regression of industry imports, the amount of goods and services imported to sector j at time t 
from abroad, on the share of foreign capital. The positive coefficients of THORIZjt and 
GHORIZjt suggest that both types of foreign investors tend to import their supplies from 
abroad rather than use domestic suppliers. In addition, according to the Table 6, domestic 
companies oriented at foreign markets are able to deal with this fact. The regression in Table 
6 is run on the firm level, although companies are divided into export- and non-export-
oriented groups based on data on the sector level. A sector is considered to be export-oriented 
if it exports on average over the period 1995-2005 at least 50% of its production abroad. The 
coefficients of both backward spillover variables are statistically insignificant. However, 
domestic companies oriented mostly on the domestic market have nobody else to supply. In 
this case, there are significant and negative backward spillover effects, from takeovers as well 
as from greenfields. Since the number of these domestically-oriented companies is bigger 
than the export-oriented, these negative effects dominate when the sample of all “always-
domestic” companies is employed.  
Table 4 also presents the results from the estimation using a population of “to-now-
domestic” companies in order to verify the potential endogeneity of foreign ownership. The 
results are consistent with little cherry picking by foreign investors because the estimated 
coefficients have basically the same magnitudes as when the sample of “always-domestic” 
companies was employed.  
5.2. FDI Spillovers on Various Subsamples 
The previous results indicate that there are strong backward spillover effects from FDI 
on domestic companies, either from takeovers or from greenfields. Horizontal spillover 
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 effects are present as well but they are much less statistically or economically significant. 
Additionally, there are no forward spillovers present. However, these effects may be 
prevalent or stronger only in some period of time or in some specific group of companies. 
Fortunately, our sufficiently big sample allows us to create several smaller subsamples. Thus, 
regression (7) is run stepwise on two subsamples from the periods 1995-2000 and 2001-2005. 
Moreover, it is run on a subsample from the period 1998-2005 to see the impact of FDI on 
domestic companies after the boom in 1998. Then, it is run also on a subsample of “smaller” 
companies. In this case, a company is defined as “smaller at time t” if its amount of fixed 
assets in year t is lower than the average amount of fixed assets of all companies within a 
sector in year t. This case is interesting because there are potentially two opposite effects. 
Due to their smaller size, these companies may be flexible and capable to quickly adjust to a 
new situation in a market. On the other hand, precisely because of their smaller size, they 
have only limited sources for improving their technologies or hiring new managers. Finally, 
regression (7) is run on subsamples of only-manufacturing companies as well as only-service 
companies to see the impact of FDI on these specific industries.  
The results of the estimated coefficients from the six regressions on subsamples of 
always-domestic companies are summarized in Table 7. The coefficients of inputs are almost 
the same as with the original sample. The only difference is that the coefficient of fixed assets 
is not significant for later periods. The results for the period 1998-2005, i.e., the period of 
FDI boom in the Czech Republic, are almost the same as for the whole sample. However 
additionally, there are positive and significant, though only weakly, forward spillover effects 
from takeovers as well as from greenfields. These results are even more obvious during the 
years 2001-2005 when positive and strongly significant forward spillover effects are the only 
found effects. Thus, it might suggest an ability of domestic companies to improve themselves 
once they are offered better or improved products and services from foreign companies from 
upstream sectors and their enhanced ability to learn and adjust in this later period. It is also 
interesting that while at the beginning domestic companies used to only suffer from the 
presence of foreign investors, especially greenfields, the situation turned around recently and 
domestic companies mostly gain from the presence of these foreign investors.  
The situation for “smaller” companies just copies the overall results with mixed results 
for horizontal spillovers and negative backward spillovers. Thus, as regards the potential 
opposite effects mentioned above, none of them dominates the other one. While the results 
for manufacturing companies do not reveal any significant spillovers, the last column shows 
that especially the service sector is the one that loses in the presence of foreign investors. 
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 Both backward spillovers from takeovers and greenfields are negative, significant and more 
than double in magnitude compared to the overall results. Regarding horizontal spillovers, the 
overall positive spillover effect from takeovers now diminishes and the negative impact from 
greenfields is even bigger. These are natural results because service companies are almost 
completely domestically oriented and usually they are not forced by the domestic market to 
improve their products. Therefore, it is even harder for them to adjust to the presence of 
foreign companies. However, a forward spillover effect from takeovers is found to be 
positive, which is partially in line with the results from the previous paragraph.  
5.3. Time Aspects of FDI Spillovers 
The sections above assume that horizontal and vertical spillover effects from takeovers 
as well as greenfields are constant over time. But it is reasonable to assume that since foreign 
investors are usually one step ahead of domestic companies, these domestic companies need 
some time to improve their technology or efficiency. Moreover, the inflow of FDI has 
increased substantially since 1998, but this increase takes some time to have an effect. It is 
often the case, particularly for big greenfield investments, that although they are assigned to 
one specific year, it takes 1-2 years till these new companies start to produce and 
consequently to have an impact on a market. The similar reasoning holds also for acquisitions 
by foreign investors; an impact on these companies’ production is often not immediate.  
Therefore, in order to allow for the lagged effects of horizontal and vertical spillovers, 
two separate modifications of model (7), already with the lagged spillover variables, are 
estimated. The estimation results are reported in Table 8. For comparison, the first column 
comprises the results from the baseline model (7). Although there are positive/negative 
significant horizontal spillovers from takeover/greenfields in time t, they are now 
insignificant for both lags. Hence, initially domestic companies are slightly affected by the 
presence of foreign companies within their sector. But already after 1 year both of these 
positive and negative effects disappear. Regarding backward spillovers, they show some 
persistence for takeovers but only for 1 period. Otherwise, the situation is similar to 
horizontal spillovers. Domestic companies tend to adjust within a year, so after an initial 
negative shock they are able to regain their positions within 1-2 years. Thus, horizontal and 
backward spillover effects are sensitive to time and they occur mostly within the same year as 
a foreign investment. However, forward spillover effects on consuming domestic companies 
are significant only after 1 or 2 years after a foreign investment. In case of takeovers, this 
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 effect is positive, while for greenfields this effect is negative. This is an interesting result, 
especially in connection with the results from time t. It suggests a dynamic pattern in FDI 
spillovers. At first, domestic companies are positively affected by the presence of foreign 
takeovers within their sector. Then, this positive impact is translated through forward 
spillovers on their consumers in the next period. At the same time, foreign greenfields cause 
an opposite effect – negative initial impact on domestic companies, later translated through 
negative forward spillovers.   
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the horizontal and vertical spillover effects of FDI on the sales 
growth of Czech domestic companies over the period 1995-2005. In contrast to the previous 
literature, we study these spillovers with respect to two kinds of foreign investment – 
acquisitions and greenfields.  
The results suggest that especially supplying domestic companies are affected by the 
presence of foreign investors downstream through negative backward spillover effects. The 
impact is bigger in case of greenfields: a 1 percentage point increase in foreign capital in 
takeovers/greenfields in a downstream sector causes a decrease in the growth rate of the sales 
of supplying domestic companies by 0.7/1.5 percentage points. This evidence can be 
explained by the fact that both types of foreign investors tend to import their supplies from 
abroad instead of using domestic suppliers. As a consequence, those domestic companies that 
are oriented mainly on the domestic market lose their sales. Regarding horizontal spillover 
effects, they are statistically weaker and much smaller in magnitude. However, the main 
difference is that foreign takeovers have a positive impact on domestic companies within 
their sector. The impact of greenfields remains negative. These contradictory results are 
probably the reason why the most of previous studies find only weak or insignificant 
horizontal spillovers. No forward spillover effects are present. Negative spillovers, horizontal 
or backward, are present especially in service sectors, which is again the consequence of their 
mainly domestic orientation. However, once they are offered “better” products from upstream 
sectors with foreign takeovers presence, their sales growth increases.  
Furthermore, we consider also the time aspect of these spillovers. In this case, the 
results suggest a dynamic pattern in FDI spillovers. At first, domestic companies are 
positively affected by the presence of foreign takeovers within their sector. Then, this 
positive impact is translated through forward spillovers on their consumers in the next period. 
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 At the same time, foreign greenfields cause an opposite effect – negative initial impact on 
domestic companies, later translated into negative forward spillovers. Thus, we can conclude 
that all of these spillover effects are sensitive to time. Horizontal and backward spillovers 
occur mostly within the same year as a foreign investment, whereas forward spillovers need 
at least 1 year.  
To conclude, we find that Czech domestic companies are not profiting from the 
presence of foreign investors. The overall impact on their sales growth rate is mostly 
negative, although the impact from takeovers is mixed and differs for supplying and 
consuming domestic companies. On the other hand, the results from the recent period are 
quite promising. Especially consuming domestic companies start to gain and their sales 
growth rates increase. Nevertheless, we are still not able to answer the question laid at the 
beginning – whom should we support more? Takeovers partially promote sales growth rate of 
other domestic companies, while the impact from greenfields is rather negative. But in fact, it 
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8. Appendix 
Data cleaning procedure 
Starting with the original data set we perform the following procedures:  
•  sales, fixed assets, staff costs  
-  Observations other than from December 31 are dropped.  
-  If there are more observations (from various accounting systems) for the same company and 
year, we use only the one from the most frequent accounting system.  
-  Missing values are replaced by interpolated values.  
•  ownership structure  
-  The sum of weighted averages, according to the number of reported days out of 365, of all 
owners within a year is used for creating a company’s ownership structure. This structure afterwards 
includes the share of foreign as well as domestic capital for each company in each particular year. 
-  When in two consecutive years (t and t+1) the share of domestic capital does not change and 
19 
 the value of the share of foreign capital in time t is missing, then this missing value is replaced with the 
value of foreign share from time t+1.  
-  We also assume the foreign share to be non-decreasing which allows considering a company 
as foreign also in the next year even in absence of ownership structure information once it is found to 
be foreign in any previous year with a known ownership structure.  
-  Observations from the years 1993 and 1994 are dropped due to missing ownership 
information.  
-  Observations from the year 2006 are dropped as well because they are recorded only till    
June 30, 2006.  
•  cleaning of variables  
-  Companies with only one year-observation are dropped since it is not possible to compute a 
growth rate for them.  
-  Negative values of ownership shares are dropped.  
-  If the sum of percentage ownerships of foreign and domestic owners is greater than 110%, the 
observation is dropped.  
-  Sectors with a strong regulatory role of the government are dropped:  
*  NACE-01 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities  
*  NACE-02 Forestry, logging and related service activities  
*  NACE-05 Fishing, fish farming and related service activities  
*  NACE-40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  
*  NACE-41 Collection, purification and distribution of water  
*  NACE-75 Public administration & defence; compulsory social security  
*  NACE-80 Education  
*  NACE-85 Health and social work  
 
Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: FDI inflow into the Czech Republic. 
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Source: Czech National Bank 
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Table 1: Number of companies by year. 
 
The column “all” includes information about the number of companies from each year; the column “domestic” 
denotes only always-domestic companies in each year; the column “foreign” includes the number of foreign 
companies in each year; the column “takeover” comprises the number of takeovers in each year; and the column 
“greenfield” denotes the number of greenfields in each year. 
 
year all  domestic  foreign  takeover  greenfield 
1995  1 336  1 066  127  176  94 
1996  2 007  1 558  273  256  193 
1997  2 370  1 816  400  309  245 
1998  2 570  1 924  507  330  316 
1999  2 682  1 936  636  357  389 
2000  2 788  1 937  777  401  450 
2001  2 644  1 763  838  413  468 
2002  2 599  1 674  910  410  515 
2003  2 361  1 528  833  370  463 
2004  1  199 722 473 201 276 
2005  1  124 665 459 178 281 




Table 2: Summary statistics. 
 
The variable foreign denotes the share of foreign capital in a company and the variable domestic denotes the 
share of domestic capital in a company. 
 
variable     observations  mean  std.  deviation  min  max 
sales (ths. CZK)    23 680  663 282  3 453 186  1  177 800 000 
fixed assets (ths. CZK)    23 680  410 876  2 792 964  1  130 500 000 
staff costs (ths. CZK)    23 680  71 009  279 695  1  8 499 800 
Δln sales    23 680  0.019  0.997  -10.979  14.458 
Δln fixed assets    23 680  0.030  0.745  -9.543  11.785 
Δln staff costs    23 680  0.062  0.617  -9.641  9.968 
foreign (%)    23 680  19.900  37.328  0  100.275 
domestic (%)    23 680  37.854  40.290  0  109.678 
T-horizontal   23  680  0.095  0.128  0  0.929 
T-backward   23  680  0.073  0.065  0  0.648 
T-forward   23  680  0.073  0.051  0.004  0.323 
G-horizontal   23  680  0.143  0.158  0  1.000 
G-backward   23  680  0.086  0.058  0.001  0.411 




Table 3: Number of companies by NACE classification. 
 
This table presents the classification of companies according to NACE and the type of ownership. The column 
“all” includes the total number of all companies in each sector; the column “domestic” denotes only always-
domestic companies in each sector; the column “takeover” comprises the number of takeovers in each sector; 
and the column “greenfield” denotes the number of greenfields in each sector. 
 







10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat   10  9  1  0 
14 Other mining and quarrying   33  25  5  3 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages   280  228  35  17 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products   3  0  0  3 
17 Manufacture of textiles   78  61  10  7 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur   14  13  1  0 
19 Manufacture of leather and leather products   12  10  2  0 
20 Manufacture of wood and wood products   75  59  13  3 
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products   33  19  8  6 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media   50  33  9  8 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel   4  3  1  0 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products   91  55  21  15 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products   53  25  14  14 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products   152  97  40  15 
27 Manufacture of basic metals   75  59  13  3 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products   151  110  23  18 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.   222  165  34  23 
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers   4  1  0  3 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.   95  55  21  19 
32 Manufacture of radio, TV and communication equipment   37  23  4  10 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments   38  29  4  5 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers   62  28  18  16 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment   30  21  8  1 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.   32  20  8  4 
37 Recycling   15  15  0  0 
45 Construction   225  190  26  9 
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles   106  81  3  22 
51 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles   647  341  52  254 
52 Retail trade; repair of personal and household goods   182  113  12  57 
55 Hotels and restaurants   70  55  5  10 
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines   107  96  7  4 
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies   50  24  8  18 
64 Post and telecommunications   43  17  8  18 
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding   207  150  19  38 
66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security  1  1  0  0 
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation   19  15  1  3 
70 Real estate services   260  206  24  30 
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator   14  8  1  5 
72 Computer and related services   84  45  7  32 
73 Research and development   28  24  2  2 
74 Other business services   460  332  42  86 
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities   63  56  4  3 
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities   32  27  1  4 
93 Other service activities   6  6  0  0 




Table 4: Baseline specification. 
 
This table presents the estimated horizontal and vertical spillover effects of FDI, divided by takeovers and 
greenfields. The dependent variable is Δln SALES. The first column represents the model with spillovers 
examined on the sample of always-domestic companies, the second represents spillovers estimated on the 
sample of to-now-domestic companies, and the last one shows the results using the sample of all companies, 
including the foreign owned. 
 
      always-domestic to-now-domestic whole  population 
const   0.267***  0.270***  0.269*** 
     (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.035) 
ΔlnFA   0.065***  0.063***  0.049*** 
     (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.018) 
ΔlnSC   0.601***  0.609***  0.632*** 
     (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.038) 
T-Horizontal   0.144*  0.164**  0.165** 
     (0.081)  (0.080)  (0.072) 
T-Backward   -0.714***  -0.732***  -0.787*** 
     (0.265)  (0.263)  (0.224) 
T-Forward   0.463  0.501  0.132 
     (0.398)  (0.412)  (0.366) 
G-Horizontal   -0.255**  -0.247**  -0.153 
     (0.115)  (0.113)  (0.098) 
G-Backward   -1.468***  -1.391***  -1.235*** 
     (0.411)  (0.403)  (0.411) 
G-Forward   -0.278  -0.302  0.526 
     (0.568)  (0.561)  (0.498) 
Year dummies     yes  yes  yes 
number of obs.    16 589  17 447  23 680 
F statistic     40.64  42.11  60.82 
 
Note: Regressions with firms' fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected 









Table 5: The relationship between FDI and import. 
 
This table presents the results from the regression of sector import on the shares of foreign capital in takeovers 
and greenfields within the sector. 
 
dependent variable      IMPORTjt 
const            19 366.840*** 
                 (2 164.019) 
THORIZjt        98 220.337*** 
                 (13 581.524)     
GHORIZjt       12 035.839*     
                 (7 109.411)      
number of obs.           441 
R
2     0.135       
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, 




Table 6: Division by non-exporting and exporting sectors. 
 
This table presents the estimated horizontal and vertical spillover effects of FDI, divided by takeovers and 
greenfields, on two different subsamples of always-domestic companies. The division is done according to 
exporting strategies on the sector level. It explains the negative backward spillover effects found in regression 
(7). The dependent variable is Δln SALES. 
 
sectors      non-exporting  exporting 
const     0.331***  0.112** 
      (0.045)  (0.045) 
ΔlnFA     0.068***  0.030 
      (0.022)  (0.057) 
ΔlnSC     0.583***  0.704*** 
      (0.048)  (0.084) 
T-Horizontal     0.262**  0.019 
      (0.106)  (0.120) 
T-Backward     -1.156***  0.037 
      (0.353)  (0.329) 
T-Forward     1.126**  -0.053 
      (0.504)  (0.657) 
G-Horizontal     -0.381**  -0.138 
      (0.150)  (0.150) 
G-Backward     -2.109***  -0.446 
      (0.517)  (0.694) 
G-Forward     -0.005  -2.944*** 
      (0.660)  (1.064) 
Year dummies     yes  yes 
number of obs.     13 383  3 206 
F statistic     33.90  15.92 
 
Note: Regressions with firms' fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected 
for clustering for each company; significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
Table 7: Different subsamples. 
 
This table presents the estimated horizontal and vertical spillover effects of FDI, divided by takeovers and greenfields, on several different subsamples of always-domestic 
companies. The first three columns represents different time spans, the last three represent a sample of smaller domestic companies, a sample of companies from 
manufacturing sectors, and a sample of companies from service sectors. The dependent variable is Δln SALES. 
 
specification      1995-2000  2001-2005  1998-2005  FA<mean  manufacture service 
const      0.337*** -0.700***  0.047  0.244*** 0.034  0.483*** 
        (0.053) (0.262) (0.155) (0.045) (0.040) (0.066) 
ΔlnFA      0.066**  0.026 0.036 0.056***  0.081**  0.053** 
        (0.026) (0.043) (0.025) (0.021) (0.038) (0.025) 
ΔlnSC      0.617*** 0.528*** 0.565*** 0.604*** 0.639*** 0.567*** 
        (0.051) (0.083) (0.051) (0.043) (0.083) (0.052) 
T-Horizontal      0.080 -0.155  0.157*  0.206**  0.027 0.211 
        (0.183) (0.197) (0.093) (0.096) (0.101) (0.160) 
T-Backward      1.033 0.671 -0.947***  -0.741**  0.438 -1.720*** 
        (0.673) (1.202) (0.344) (0.314) (0.293) (0.496) 
T-Forward      -1.360  3.106***  0.909*  0.344 0.482 2.833*** 
        (1.058) (1.048) (0.480) (0.468) (0.577) (0.668) 
G-Horizontal      -0.055 -0.067 -0.270**  -0.245*  0.100  -0.475*** 
        (0.202) (0.223) (0.131) (0.138) (0.164) (0.173) 
G-Backward     -2.366***  -0.919  -1.602*** -1.194**  -0.640  -3.191*** 
        (0.734) (0.930) (0.507) (0.468) (0.519) (1.005) 
G-Forward      -2.521**  4.422***  1.328*  0.035 0.044 0.448 
        (1.133) (1.523) (0.767) (0.665) (0.670) (1.221) 
Year  dummies      yes yes yes yes yes yes 
number of obs.           10 237  6 352  12 149  13 007  6 891  8380 
F statistic                39.25  8.83  23.75  34.86  24.38  25.06 
 
 
Note: Regressions with firms' fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected for clustering for each company; significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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 Table 8: The specification with lags. 
 
This table presents the results from specifications when spillover variables are allowed to be lagged by 1 or 2 
years. The results are estimated on a sample of always-domestic companies only. The dependent variable is    
Δln SALES. 
 
     t t-1  t-2 
const            0.267***  0.274**  0.064 
                 (0.037)  (0.115)  (0.133) 
ΔlnFA     0.065***  0.061***  0.054** 
      (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
ΔlnSC     0.601***  0.588***  0.599*** 
                 (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.047) 
T-Horizontalt     0.144*     
                 (0.081)     
T-Horizontalt-1       0.028   
                   (0.100)   
T-Horizontalt-2         -0.038 
                     (0.127) 
T-Backwardt     -0.714***     
                 (0.265)     
T-Backwardt-1       -0.742**   
                   (0.289)   
T-Backwardt-2         0.175 
                     (0.311) 
T-Forwardt     0.463     
                 (0.398)     
T-Forwardt-1       1.847***   
                   (0.486)   
T-Forwardt-2         2.119*** 
                       (0.637) 
G-Horizontalt     -0.255**     
                 (0.115)     
G-Horizontalt-1       -0.125   
                   (0.111)   
G-Horizontalt-2         0.026 
                     (0.142) 
G-Backwardt     -1.468***     
                 (0.411)     
G-Backwardt-1       0.221   
                   (0.451)   
G-Backwardt-2         0.544 
                     (0.526) 
G-Forwardt     -0.278     
                 (0.568)     
G-Forwardt-1       -2.427***   
                   (0.647)   
G-Forwardt-2         -1.968** 
                       (0.798) 
Year dummies      yes  yes  yes 
number of obs.           16 589  15 523  13 965 
F statistic                40.64  33.79  29.93 
 
Note: Regressions with firms' fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected 
for clustering for each company; significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
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